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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
: Case No. 
-vs- 13865 
• • 
DENNIS G. KAZDA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant was convicted of theft before the 
Honorable Jay E. Banks presiding in the Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County. Appellant appeals, claiming that the 
prosecutor prejudicially commented in his closing argument 
concerning appellant's failure to testify. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT. 
At a jury trial, the appellant was found guilty of 
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the crime of theft. ! 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL | 
N
 Respondent seeks to have the conviction of the 
lower court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant was charged with theft—taking bundles 
of roofing shingles from a construction site. Appellant 
was found late at night at the scene of the theft. Appellant 
did not testify, nor did the defense produce any witnesses 
explaining appellant's presence in the area. 
In his closing argument, the prosecutor instructed 
the jury that appellant had no duty to take the stand and that 
his failure to testify should create no inference of guilt 
or innocence. He then stated that, "The defense has presented 
no evidence as to why the defendant was out there. What was 
he doing out there?" (T.99). 
Following this remark defense counsel moved for a 
mistrial, which was denied but the court specifically admonished 
the jury to draw no inference from the state's comments and 
-2-
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r e m i n d e d t h e m t h a t c o u n s e l ' s s t a t e m e n t s a r e n o t e v i d e n c e . 
He f u r t h e r d i r e c t e d t h e j u r y t o f o l l o w t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s 
g i v e n by t h e c o u r t r e g a r d i n g a d e f e n d a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o 
t e s t i f y ( I n s t r u c t i o n N o . 9 ) . D e f e n s e c o u n s e l f u r t h e r 
e m p h a s i z e d t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n t o t h e j u r y i n h i s c l o s i n g 
a r g u m e n t . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO ADVERSE COMMENT BY THE PROSECUTION 
ON THE DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO TESTIFY. 
The comment c o m p l a i n e d o f made d u r i n g t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s 
c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t c a n n o t b e c o n s t r u e d a s a n a d v e r s e comment on 
a p p e l l a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o t e s t i f y n o r a s an i n f e r e n c e t h a t a p p e l -
l a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o t e s t i f y i n d i c a t e s g u i l t . T h i s i s s u p p o r t e d 
by t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e c a s e . 
The p r o s e c u t o r ' s comment was p r e f a c e d b y an e x p l i c i t 
r e m i n d e r t o t h e j u r y t h a t no i n f e r e n c e c o u l d b e d r a w n from 
a p p e l l a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o t e s t i f y . H i s s t a t e m e n t d i r e c t e d t h e 
j u r y ' s a t t e n t i o n t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e t e s t i m o n y of t h e 
s t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s was u n c o n t r a d i c t e d , w h i c h , i n f a c t , i t w a s . 
- 3 -
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<s 
The prosecutor's remarks were not directly or indirectly 
intended to suggest that appellant's silence was incriminating 
or even suspect. 
T h i s k i n d of comment a b o u t u n c o n t r a d i c t e d e v i d e n c e 
has s u p p o r t i n s e v e r a l c a s e s . In S t a t e v . A c o s t a # 101 A r i z . 
1 2 7 , . 4 1 6 P .2d 560 ( 1 9 6 6 ) , t h e A r i z o n a Supreme Cour t h e l d t h a t 
a s t a t e m e n t s i m i l a r t o t h e one i n v o l v e d h e r e d i d no t c o n s t i t u t e 
"comments on t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o t e s t i f y , b u t /~~were_7 
mere g e n e r a l comments on t h e f a c t t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e was u n -
c o n t r a d i c t e d . " 416 P .2d a t 5 6 0 . The comment o b j e c t e d t o was 
as f o l l o w s : 
"You h e a r d t h e t e s t i m o n y of 
a l l t h e w i t n e s s e s t h a t were p r e s e n t e d 
by t h e S t a t e i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c a s e . 
And, i t h a s n o t been c o n t r o v e r t e d , 
e x c e p t by c o u n s e l ' s c r o s s e x a m i n a t i o n . 
Tha t i s t h e on ly c o n t r o v e r s y of any of 
t h e t e s t i m o n y of S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s . " 
416 P .2d a t 5 6 1 . 
The above s t a t e m e n t i n Acos t a was v iewed a s a comment 
on u n c o n t r a d i c t e d e v i d e n c e j u s t i f y i n g a v e r d i c t of g u i l t y . 
C i t e d i n Acos ta and t o t h e same e f f e c t i s Tomar i s v . S t a t e , 
71 A r i z . 147 , 224 P . 2 d 209 (1950) , a l s o an A r i z o n a Supreme 
C o u r t d e c i s i o n . 
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A recent federal case, United States v. McCrae# 
344 F.Supp. 942 (D.C.E.D. Penn., 1972) , follows the spirit 
of Acosta. There a motion for a new trial was made .on the 
grounds that the prosecutor made reference to the uncontroverted 
testimony of government witnesses and the defense's failure to 
produce witnesses to rebut testimony of government witnesses.. 
In denying the motion the Court stated: 
"Reference by the prosecutor to 
. testimony as being uncontradicted does 
not violate the privilege against self-
incrimination. United States v. Giuliano, 
383 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1967); nor does 
reference to failure to produce a witness 
or testimony to rebut testimony presented 
by the government constitute impermissible 
comment on defendant's failure to testify. 
United States v. Smith, 421 F.2d 1299 (3d 
Cir. 1970). If any of the comments in govern-
ment counsel's closing speech raised any doubts 
at all about the effect of defendant's failure 
to testify, they were unquestionably resolved 
by the court's instructions on the subject 
(at N.T. 4-77, 4-78) : 
'Members of the jury, I have told you 
that a defendant enjoys the presumption o£ 
innocence. He has the right not to take the 
stand in any case in which he is charged, 
because it is always the government's burden 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and if the defendant does not 
take the stand, as Mr. McCrae did not 
v in this case, you may not draw any 
inferences whatsoever from the failure 
to take the stand. That must never enter 
into your deliberations. He has the 
absolute and unqualified right not to 
take the stand. He has the absolute and 
unqualified right to ask the government 
to prove its case as it is required to do 
beyond a reasonable doubt without any 
help from him. You must bear that in 
mind, members of the jury. You must never, 
never allow that to enter your consideration 
at any point. ,M 344 F.Supp. at 946. 
In Cloud v. State, 507 S.W.2d 667 (Mo.App. 1974), 
the Missouri Supreme Court found no error in the following 
comments by a prosecutor in closing argument: 
"The re i s no c o n t r a d i c t i o n of 
t h e s t a t e ' s e v i d e n c e t h a t t h i s c r i m e 
was commit ted a t t h e r e s i d e n c e of M o r r i s 
& J e w e l S t u d n e r ; t h e r e i s no c o n t r a d i c t i o n 
t h a t /~~defendant_J7 J e r r y R o b e r t Cloud was 
t h e p e r s o n . . . Remember a l s o t h a t you 
have no e v i d e n c e t o c o n t r a d i c t my e v i d e n c e , 
put on by t h e s t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s . " 507 
S.W.2d a t 6 6 9 . 
The M i s s o u r i Cour t f u r t h e r e x p l a i n e d t h a t " t h e 
a u t h o r i t i e s " h o l d t h a t such comments mean n o t h i n g more t h a n 
- 6 -
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tha t evidence a l l coming from the s t a t e i s uncontradicted 
by the defense. This is the na tura l meaning of the 
p rosecu tor ' s remarks in the ins tan t case., espec ia l ly in 
l igh t of the absence of defense witnesses . 
An even more exp l i c i t reference to uncontradicted 
s t a t e testimony was allowed in Newell v. Slayton, 468 F.2d 
888 (4th Ci r . 1972). There a convicted defendant ' s pet i t ion 
for writ of habeas corpus was denied over objection by 
p e t i t i o n e r to the prosecut ion ' s following comment made during 
closing argument: 
"There i s no evidence to explain 
away her /""main government witness_J7 
testimony. If he wasn't there on 
March 10, 1968, where was he? Was 
he with somebody e lse? Rest assured 
Mr. Murphy /""defense counsel_7 would 
have had tha t other person subpoenaed 
and on t h i s witness stand to explain 
where he was i f he wasn't t he re . " 
Prosecut ion 's comments in the present case were not as d i r ec t 
or involved as the nonprejudicial comments in Cloud and Slayton. 
The statement here was prefaced by a warning t o the jurors that 
a p p e l l a n t ' s f a i l u r e to t e s t i f y was not being d iscred i ted or 
emphasized. The effect of the comment was d i lu ted by the t r i a l 
-7-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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judge in l imit ing the comment to two sentences and r e -
emphasizing to the jury the non-evidentiary nature of 
statements by counsel. 
The defense 's most persuasive case i s Griffin v. 
California . The defense maintains in t h e i r br ief at page 
5 that the holding in Griffin "requires the conclusion that 
i t was revers ib le er ror for the prosecuting attorney to 
comment on the defendant 's fa i lu re to t e s t i f y in his own 
defense." 
There are two c r i t i c a l weaknesses in t h i s conclu-
sion which preclude Griffin from cont ro l l ing t h i s case . 
The f i r s t i s the assumption that the prosecut ion ' s 
remark was a comment on the defendant 's f a i lu re to t e s t i f y 
in his own defense. As has been mentioned above the prosecu-
t i o n ' s statement was a reference t o the uncontradicted testimony 
of s t a t e witnesses. In cases with s imi lar , though more d i rec t 
comments, the courts have universa l ly deemed such language 
as non-prejudicia l and as inadequate grounds for r e v e r s a l . 
- 8 -
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See Cloud, Slayton, McCrae. 
The second weakness in the defensefs conclusion 
as t-b the effect of the holding in Griffin is that Griffin 
can be distinguished from the present case on critical 
facts and is therefore not controlling. First, Griffin was 
donvicted in a state where, by statute, the prosecutor was 
authorized to make a direct comment on the accused's failure 
to testify, where it appeared reasonable that the defendant 
should explain his conduct. Second, the jury was actually 
instructed in that case that they could draw an adverse 
inference from the defendant's failure to testify. The 
instruction is quoted in the Supreme Court's opinion, as 
follows: 
"As to any evidence or facts 
against him which the defendant can 
reasonably be expected to deny or 
explain because of facts within his 
knowledge, if he does not testify or if, 
though he does testify, he fails to deny 
or explain such evidence, the jury may 
take that failure into consideration as 
tending to indicate the truth of such 
evidence and as indicating that among the 
inferences that may be reasonably drawn, 
therefrom those unfavorable to the 
defendant are the more probable." 
-9-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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• 
Finally, the comment of the prosecutor was direct 
and vivid. He stated to the jury: 
"The defendant certainly knows 
whether Essie Mae had this beat up 
appearance at the time he left her 
apartment and went down the alley 
. with her. 
"What kind of a man is it that 
would want to have sex with a woman 
that beat up if she was beat up at 
the time he left? 
"He would know that. He would know 
how she got down the alley. He would 
know how the blood got on the bottom of 
the concrete steps. He would know how 
long he was with her in that box. He 
would know how her wig got off. He would 
know whether he beat her or mistreated her. 
He would know whether he walked away from 
that place cool as a cucumber when he saw 
Mr. Villasenor because he was conscious 
of his own guilt and wanted to get away 
from that damaged or injured woman. 
"These things he has not seen fit 
to take the stand and deny or explain. 
"And in the whole word, if anybody 
would know, this defendant would know. 
Essie Mae is dead, she can't tell you her 
side of the story. The defendant won't." 
A divided Supreme Court found that the language used 
in Griffin was so blatant as to be reversible error. The 
statement in the present case is not at all like the Griffin 
-10-
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language in either content or intent. Rather, the comment 
here, closely aligns with the cases cited which sanction 
prosecution comments on uncontroverted state testimony. 
In addition to Griffin, appellant cited People v. 
Vargas, 509 P.2d 959 (Calif. 1973), and People v. Burress, 
515 P.2d 460 (Colo. 1973), as decisions "from sister states 
with similar holdings based on similar language," Appellant's 
brief at page 8. Neither case is particularly compelling. 
In Vargas, a robbery prosecution in which defendants 
did not take the stand, the prosecution stated in his closing 
argument that "there is no denial at all that they /"""defendants 
were there." 509 P.2d at 961. This was objected to as being 
a comment upon defendants1 failure to testify. The California 
Supreme Court held that this was Griffin error because only the 
accused could deny his presence at the scene of the crime 
whereas any witness could "explain" the facts. The Court 
affirmed the conviction, however, because the error was, in 
their opinion, "harmless," and cited several cases at page 965 
which hold likewise. The Vargas Court also mentions that "not 
every comment upon defendant's failure to present a defense 
-11-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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cons t i tu tes Griffin e r ro r . " 509 P.2d at 962. The Court in 
Vargas c i t e s Chapman v. Cal i fornia , 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 
to indicate that a l l cons t i tu t iona l error i s not necessar i ly 
revers ib le and can be deemed harmless i f the court declares a 
be l ie f that i t ^f~the error_7 was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
People v. Burress i s a Colorado case in which the 
defendant (accused of a ssau l t with a deadly weapon) "took 
the stand in h is own defense and t e s t i f i e d freely as to the 
events surrounding the stabbing inc ident . " 515 P.2d at 464. 
The error found by the court was the prosecut ion 's misleading 
comments during cross-examination of the accused concerning 
his fa i lu re to ta lk with police during the inves t iga t ion . 
The present case i s l ike Vargas, where the conviction 
was affirmed, error notwithstanding, although the prosecut ion ' s 
comments here are less inflammatory and less suscept ible to 
adverse in t e rp re t a t ion than the remarks in Vargas. Burress i s 
d iss imi lar both as to the context of the disputed remark and 
the nature of defendant 's s i l e n c e . 
-12-
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B e c a u s e G r i f f i n d o e s n o t c o n t r o l i n t h i s c a s e a n d 
b e c a u s e t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s c o m m e n t s w e r e n o t d i r e c t e d a t 
a p p e l l a n t f s f a i l u r e t o t e s t i f y , t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n 
s h o u l d b e a f f i r m e d . 
POINT I I 
I F THERE WAS ERROR IN THE COMMENTS COMPLAINED OF, . 
IT WAS CURED BY THE COURT. 
A s s u m i n g a r g u e n d o t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s c o m m e n t s 
w e r e , i n f a c t , e r r o r , w h a t e v e r p r e j u d i c e t h e y may h a v e c r e a t e d 
t o w a r d t h e d e f e n d a n t was c u r e d b y t h e t h o r o u g h a n d t i m e l y 
i n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o t h e j u r y . The i n s t r u c t i o n - -
t h a t t h e j u r y w a s t o d r a w no a d v e r s e i n f e r e n c e f rom t h e 
d e f e n d a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o t e s t i f y — w a s g i v e n i n t h e w r i t t e n 
i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e j u r y ( I n s t r u c t i o n N o . 9) a n d was 
e m p h a s i z e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s 
c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t . A s i m i l a r p o t e n t i a l e r r o r i n U n i t e d S t a t e s v . 
M c C r a e , q u o t e d a b o v e , was c u r e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s e m p h a t i c 
r e m i n d e r t o t h e j u r y t o a v o i d d r a w i n g a n y i n f e r e n c e s f rom t h e 
d e f e n d a n t ' s s i l e n c e . 
- 1 3 -
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The general rule is that "prompt and emphatic 
condemnation by the trial judge may cure an improper 
argument of government counsel." Knowles v. United States, 
224 F.2d 168, 170 (10th Cir. 1955). 
The process used by the trial judge in the present 
case for rectifying a possibly inflammatory statement by the • 
prosecution is more than sufficient to avoid reversal. 
Knowles v. United States also provides a test which 
should be used in the present case for determining when a 
prosecutor's comments about a defendant's failure to testify 
are reversible error. The test is "whether the language used 
was manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury 
would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the 
failure of the accused to testify." 224 F.2d at 170. When 
this test is applied, the prosecutor's comment in the present 
case cannot be viewed as reversible error. The trial judge, 
who was in the best position to determine the effect of the 
comment on the jury and the intent of the prosecutor, denied 
defense's motion for a mistrial. The test indicates that the 
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jury must, in the conjunctive, naturally and necessarily 
understand prosecutor's remark as a reference to the defendant's 
silence. The language used in the present case is neither so 
direct or unequivocal that a jury would necessarily take it as 
a comment on the accused's failure to take the stand. 
In accord with the Knowles test are several decisions 
by the Utah Supreme Court. 
In State v. Neal, 1 Utah 2d 122, 126-127, 262 P.2d . 
756 (1953), this Court said: 
"We are also conscious of the 
fact that a trial in the courts of 
this state is a proceeding in the 
interest of justice to determine the 
guilt or innocence of the accused and 
not just a game. We will not reverse 
criminal causes for mere error or 
irregularity. It is only when there 
has been error which is both substantial 
and prejudicial to the rights of the 
accused that a reversal is warranted." 
262 P.2d at 759. 
In State v. Kelbach, 23 Utah 2d 231, 461 P.2d 297, 301, 
302 (1969), the Court wrote regarding an alleged error: 
" . . . the alleged error must 
be evaluated in conformity with the 
provisions of Section 77-42-1, U.C.A. 
-15-
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1953; an appellate court must 
give judgment without regard to 
errors or defects which do not 
affect the substantial rights of 
V the parties. This court may not 
interfere with a jury verdict, unless 
upon review of the entire record, 
there emerges errors of sufficient 
gravity to indicate that defendants 
rights were prejudiced in some 
substantial manner, i.e., the error 
must be such that it is reasonably 
probable that there would have been 
a result more favorable to the 
appellant in the absence of error." 
461 P.2d at 301 and 302. 
Neal, Kelbach, and other similar Utah cases, State 
v. Baran, 25 Utah 2d 16, 474 P.2d 728 (1970) ; also State v. 
Johnson, 25 Utah 2d 160, 478 P.2d 491 (1970), follow the 
injunction of Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953), as amended, 
which states: 
"After hearing an appeal the court 
must give judgment without regard to 
errors or defects which do not affect 
the substantial rights of the parties. 
If error has been committed, it shall 
not be presumed to have resulted in 
prejudice. The court must be satisfied 
that it has that effect before it is 
warranted in reversing the judgment." 
Following either the Knowles test or the mandate of 
the Utah statute, the prosecutor's comments in the present case 
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d o n o t amoun t t o r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . I f t h e r e was e r r o r i n 
t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , i t was n e i t h e r s o s u b s t a n t i a l , d e t e r m i n a -
t i v e ( o f t h e r e s u l t i n t h e c a s e ) , o r p r e j u d i c i a l a s t o 
r e q u i r e r e v e r s i n g a u n a n i m o u s j u r y v e r d i c t o f g u i l t y . The 
c o n v i c t i o n s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e b e a f f i r m e d . 
CONCLUSION 
T h e r e was no a d v e r s e comment by t h e p r o s e c u t i o n 
r e g a r d i n g a p p e l l a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o t e s t i f y i n t h i s c a s e . The 
s t a t e m e n t i n q u e s t i o n w a s , r a t h e r , a comment on u n c o n t r a d i c t e d 
t e s t i m o n y by s t a t e w i t n e s s e s . 
I f p r o s e c u t i o n ' s comment w a s , i n f a c t , e r r o r , t h e n 
i t was n o t s o " s e r i o u s a n d f u n d a m e n t a l " a s t o b e g r o u n d s f o r 
r e v e r s a l a n d w a s , m o r e o v e r , c u r e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
i n s t r u c t i o n s r e g a r d i n g c o m m e n t s on a p p e l l a n t ' s s i l e n c e . 
F o r t h e a b o v e r e a s o n s , i t i s r e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d 
t h a t a p p e l l a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n i n t h e l o w e r c o u r t be a f f i r m e d . 
R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d , 
VERNON B . ROMNEY 
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
EARL F . DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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